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Abstract
We develop a general two-country model with oligopolistic interdependence in which
the firms make their output and emission decisions simultaneously. In this framework, we
examine the effect of unilateral and multilateral reforms of emission taxes and abatement
subsidies on global emission levels. We find that an increase in abatement subsidies — either
unilateral or multilateral — unambiguously reduces global emission levels. In the presence
of sufficient asymmetry in pollution intensities between the two countries, a unilateral or
equiproportional multilateral increase in emission taxes can increase global emission levels.
However, a multilateral increase of emission taxes of the concertina type unambiguously
reduces global emission levels.
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Introduction

The impact of environmental policies in oligopolistic industries has been the subject of a
large literature in recent years. However, very few of these studies allow for firm heterogeneity, even though this is a prevalent feature of industries. In this paper we construct a
model of international competition between asymmetric firms, and examine the impact of
environmental policy reforms adopted either unilaterally or multilaterally by the countries
where the firms operate from. We consider two types of environmental policy, viz., emission
taxes and abatement subsidies, and we also allow for different patterns of firm heterogeneity
and rules for policy reform. A key result of our paper is that different rules for multilateral
reform of emission taxes can have qualitatively different effects on global emission levels.
The literature on environmental tax/subsidy policies is vast. Most of the early studies
have either assumed perfect competition or abstracted from strategic interaction between
firms even when allowing for imperfect competition. An extensive survey of the literature up
to the early 1990s is given in Cropper and Oates (1992). More recent studies have focused
on the effects of environmental policies in oligopolistic industries, and have also examined
international aspects of environmental policy, strategic interaction between governments,
and the links between environmental policy, the location decision of firms, innovation and
market structure (see, for example, Conrad, 1993; Kennedy, 1994; Barrett, 1994; Ulph,
1996a, 1996b; Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas, 1995; Markusen et al., 1993, 1995; Lahiri and
Kayalica, 2002; and various contributions in Carraro, Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas, 1996,
and Carraro and Siniscalo, 1997).
The purpose of emission taxes and abatement subsidies is, of course, to reduce pollution. However, these policies may not always have the desired effect. Baumol and Oates
(1988, ch. 14), Mestelman (1982) and Kohn (1985) have shown that an increase in abatement
subsidies may increase the total amount of pollution because it will increase total output in
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a perfectly competitive industry; this indirect effect may dominate any direct negative effect
of subsidies on emissions per unit of output. Conrad and Wang (1993) have extended this
result to an oligopoly with free entry. However, an increase in emission taxes unambiguously
reduces emissions in these models, since in this case the direct and indirect effects of the
policy work in the same direction.
Levin (1985) was the first to point out that an increase in emission tax may raise
the total level of emissions in a homogeneous-product asymmetric oligopoly. In his model,
different firms have different pollution intensities, and there are circumstances where the
tax may increase the output of environmentally inefficient firms to such an extent that total
pollution increases.1 Others have shown that an emission tax may cause total emissions
to rise when different firms are subject to different policy instruments (Stimming, 1999) or
when firms face demand uncertainty and make decisions on their financial structure prior to
competiting in the product market (Damania, 2000).
It is now widely acknowledged that pollution is a global issue and tackling it requires a
multilateral approach. Pollution generated in one country often has far reaching implications
for other countries. With these in mind, the international community has been very active
in recent years organising international conferences to come up with binding commitments
by individual countries to reduce pollution emissions, the so-called Kyoto protocol being the
outcome of the last such high-profile conference. These multilateral approaches to policy
reform have been going hand in hand with numerous unilateral reforms that many countries
are actively pursuing. For example, the Supreme Court of India has recently enforced many
national environmental regulations which the politicians were unable to implement in fear
of backlash from vested interest groups. These developments in the policy arena have been
accompanied by academic research on the subject and there is now a small theoretical literature that analyses the implications of unilateral and multilateral reforms of environmental
1

Studies that relax the symmetry assumption in oligopoly models often reveal interesting and unexpected
welfare properties of these models. See, for example, Bergstrom and Varian, 1985; Lahiri and Ono 1988,
1997; Symeonidis, 2003.
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policies (see, for example, Beghin et al., 1997; Copeland, 1994, 1996; Hatzipanayotou et al.,
2003; Ludema and Wooton, 1997; and Turunen-Red and Woodland, 2002a, 2002b).
In spite of the multilateral agreements on environmental policies, many countries
have been reluctant to pursue the ratification of the agreements in the domestic legislatures.
One of the arguments that is commonly used to justify this is the presence of asymmetries
between countries and in the agreements themselves. For example, one argument used by
the Bush administration in the U.S. to justify the non-ratification of the Kyoto protocol is
that large countries with relatively more pollution-intensive technologies, such as China and
India, are not required by the Kyoto protocol to do very much in terms of their pollution
policies, and thus compliance by the U.S. is likely to be counterproductive. In this paper,
we examine whether multilateral agreements can be designed in a way that the presence of
asymmetries between countries cannot make the agreements counterproductive.
We do so by combining the two strands of the literature discussed above, viz., environmental policies under asymmetric oligopolistic interdependence, on one hand, and unilateral
and multilateral environmental policy reforms, on the other. In a formal sense our basic
framework of analysis can be seen as an extension of that in Levin (1985) discussed above.
More specifically, we develop a model of an international asymmetric oligopoly with product
differentiation where the firms make their output and emission decisions simultaneously.2 In
this framework, we examine the effect of unilateral and multilateral reforms of emission taxes
and abatement subsidies on global emission levels. We find that an increase in abatement
subsidies — unilateral or multilateral — unambiguously reduces global emission levels. This
result is consistent with previous literature where the number of firms is taken as fixed. We
also find that a unilateral or an equiproportional multilateral increase in emission taxes can
increase global emission levels. This result is consistent with a result in Levin (1985) which
can be interpreted as an effect of equiproportional multilateral reform, although the exact
2
In Levin (1985) emission is proportional to output and thus emission and output decisions are not
separate ones.
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circumstances where an increase in emission tax may cause pollution to rise are somewhat
different in our model because of differences in the nature of the models. However, we find
that a multilateral increase of emission taxes of the concertina type unambiguously reduces
global emission levels.3 Thus, our results indicate that, when designing multilateral reforms
of environmental policies, policy makers should be careful with the choice of the rule as this
may have important implications for the outcome of the reform.
The paper is structured as follows. We introduce the basic model in the next section.
Sections 3 and 4 examine, respectively, the impact of unilateral and multilateral environmental policies on emission levels. The final section concludes.

2

The model

There are two countries, a and b, with na and nb firms, respectively. All firms within a country
produce a homogeneous product, but there is product differentiation across countries. Inverse
demand functions in the two countries are given, respectively, by
pa = f a (x1a + · · · + xna a , x1b + · · · + xnb b ),

(1)

pb = f b (x1a + · · · + xna a , x1b + · · · + xnb b ),

(2)

where xij is the output of firm i in country j. The profit function of firm i in country j is
given by
πji = pj xij − cij (xij ) − gji (θji (xij ) − eij ) − tj eij + sj (θji (xij ) − eij ), j = a, b; i = 1, · · · , nj .

(3)

where cij (xij ) is the production cost of firm i in country j, θji (xij ) the gross pollution by firm
i in country j, eij the level of emissions of firm i in country j, the function gji (θji (xij ) − eij ) is
the cost of abatement function for firm i in country j, tj the per unit emission tax in country
j, and sj the per unit abatement subsidy in country j.
3

While our model assumes that firms compete by setting quantities in a differentiated market, the main
results carry through to the case of price-setting firms.
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All firms simultaneously choose a level of output and a level of emissions. In particular,
firm i in country a chooses a level of output to maximise its profit according to the first-order
condition
∂πai
= f1a xia + f a − ci0a − gai0 θai0 + sa θai0 = 0, i = 1, · · · , na ,
i
∂xa

(4)

while firm i in country b chooses a level of output according to the first-order condition
∂πbi
= f2b xib + f b − ci0b − gbi0 θbi0 + sb θbi0 = 0, i = 1, · · · , nb ,
∂xib

(5)

wherefkj is the partial derivative of f j with respect to the kth argument, j = a, b and k = 1, 2.
In addition, firm i in country j chooses a level of emissions according to the first-order
condition
∂πji
= gji0 − tj − sj = 0, j = a, b; i = 1, · · · , nj .
∂eij

(6)

To ensure tractability of our model, we will assume symmetry within each country.
As will be seen below, the driving mechanism for our results is the presence of asymmetries
between the two groups of firms with respect to the pollution intensity of their technology,
i.e., the function θji (xij ). Assuming that all firms within each country have similar technology
is not an unrealistic assumption if one thinks of this technology as being determined partly in
response to country-specific past policies. Suppressing the firm-specific subscripts, equations
(4)-(6) can be rewritten as
f1a (na xa , nb xb )xa + f a (na xa , nb xb ) − c0a − ga0 θa0 + sa θa0 = 0,

(7)

f2b (na xa , nb xb )xb + f b (na xa , nb xb ) − c0b − gb0 θb0 + sb θb0 = 0,

(8)

gj0 − tj − sj = 0,

(9)

(j = a, b).

Using (9), equations (7) and (8) can be rewritten as
f1a (na xa , nb xb )xa + f a (na xa , nb xb ) − c0a − θa0 ta = 0,

(10)

f2b (na xa , nb xb )xb + f b (na xa , nb xb ) − c0b − θb0 tb = 0.

(11)
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These two equations implicitly determine the equilibrium values of xa and xb .
We make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1: (i) c0j > 0, gj0 > 0, θj0 > 0, j = a, b, (ii) c00j > 0, gj00 > 0, θj00 > 0, j = a, b,
j
(iii) yfik
(Y ) + flj (Y ) < 0 for all y ≤ Y and j = a, b; i, k, l = 1, 2.

The first part of the assumption states that the gross pollution function and the cost
functions are increasing, the second part that they are convex, and the third part corresponds
to the ‘normal’ case in Seade (1980, pp. 483-484) and also to the strategic substitutes case
in Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985) and Dixit (1986). This also guarantees the
concavity of each firm’s profit function.

3

The impact of unilateral policy reform

We begin by examining the effect of an increase in emission tax or abatement subsidy in
one country on the total level of emissions. We are particularly interested in identifying
circumstances where environmental policies that are normally expected to reduce pollution
have the opposite effect, namely an increase in total emissions. Totally differentiating (9),
we get
ga00 [θa0 dxa − dea ] = dta + dsa ,

(12)

gb00 [θb0 dxb − deb ] = dtb + dsb .

(13)

Also, totally differentiating (10) and (11), we obtain
a
a
π11
dxa + π12
dxb = θa0 dta ,

(14)

b
b
π21
dxa + π22
dxb = θb0 dtb ,

(15)
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where
a0
a
π11
= xa f11
+ f1a < 0,
b0
b
π22
= xb f22
+ f2b < 0,
a
a0
π11
= na π11
+ f1a − ta θa00 − c00a < 0,
b
b0
π22
= nb π22
+ f2b − tb θb00 − c00b < 0,
a
a
+ f2a ) < 0,
= nb (xa f12
π12
b
b
+ f1b ) < 0,
= na (xb f21
π21

because of Assumption 1.
Solving (14) and (15) simultaneously for dxa and dxb , we obtain
b
a
∆ dxa = θa0 π22
dta − θb0 π12
dtb ,

(16)

a
b
∆ dxb = θb0 π11
dtb − θa0 π21
dta ,

(17)

a b
a b
where ∆ = π11
π22 − π12
π21 > 0 for the stability of the Cournot equilibrium.

From (16) and (17) it is clear that the abatement subsidies sa and sb have no effect on
output levels. However, these subsidies have direct emission reducing effects as can be seen
from (12) and (13) — although the abatement subsidy in one country does not affect the
emission level in the other country. Therefore, abatement subsidies unambiguously reduce
emissions. This result is formally stated as:

Proposition 1 An increase in abatement subsidy in one country unambiguously reduces
emission levels in that country and does not affect emission levels in the other country.

A direct implication of this result is that any type of unilateral or multilateral increase
of abatement subsidies will also unambiguously reduce emissions.
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Turning to emission taxes, define E(= na ea +nb eb ) as the global emission level. Making
use of (12), (13), (16) and (17), we write
dE
dea
deb
na
dxa
dxb
= na
+ nb
= − 00 + na θa0
+ nb θb0
dta
dta
dta
ga
dta
dta
=−

b
b
na na (θa0 )2 π22
nb θa0 θb0 π21
+
−
ga00
∆
∆

(18)

deb
dea
nb
dxb
dxa
dE
= nb
+ na
= − 00 + nb θb0
+ na θa0
dtb
dtb
dtb
gb
dtb
dtb
=−

a
a
nb nb (θb0 )2 π11
na θb0 θa0 π12
+
−
gb00
∆
∆

(19)

We are now in a position to examine one of the issues we raised earlier, viz., whether
it is possible for an increase in emission tax in one of the countries to raise global pollution.
b
b
Substituting π22
and π21
defined after (15) into (18), we get

∆

∆na
dE
b
= − 00 + na (θa0 )2 [nb xb f22
+ f2b (1 + nb ) − tb θb00 − c00b ]
dta
ga
b
− na nb θa0 θb0 [xb f21
+ f1b ].

(20)

The sign of the above expression is in general ambiguous. To see this, consider the
b
b
case of no product differentiation so that f1b = f2b and f22
= f21
. In this case from (20) we

obtain
∆

∆na
dE
b
= − 00 + na nb θa0 (θa0 − θb0 )(xb f22
+ f2b ) + na (θa0 )2 [f2b − (tb θb00 + c00b )].
dta
ga

If the two countries are similar with respect to their production technology (i.e., θa0 = θb0 ) or
the country that raises emission tax (country a) has a more pollution-intensive technology
of production (i.e., θa0 > θb0 ), the right hand side of the above equation is negative because of
Assumption 1. That is, an increase in emission tax in one country reduces total emissions.
However, when country b has a sufficiently more pollution-intensive technology, i.e., when
θb0 >> θa0 , then from (20) it is clear that dE/dta can be positive: an increase in emission tax
in the country with the less pollution-intensive technology may increase total emissions.
8

Under the linearity of demand and cost functions, while allowing for product differentiation, it is possible to obtain a tighter sufficient condition for an emission tax in a country
to raise total emissions. If the inverse demand functions are given by
pa = 1 − na xa − γnb xb ,
pb = 1 − nb xb − γna xa ,
where 0 < γ < 1 is an inverse measure of the degree of product differentiation, we have
a
a
b
b
f1a = f2b = −1, f1b = f2a = −γ, and f11
= f12
= f21
= f22
= 0. Furthermore, c00a = c00b = θa00 =

θb00 = 0. Then from (20) we get
∆

dE
∆na
= − 00 + na θa0 [nb γθb0 − θa0 (1 + nb )],
dta
ga

(21)

whence it follows that dE/dta > 0 if (i) ga00 is very large and (ii) θb0 > θa0 (1 + nb )/(γnb ). Note
that the likelihood that an increase in emission tax in the country with the less pollutionintensive technology will cause an increase in global emissions is higher the steeper the
abatement cost function in the country with the more pollution-intensive technology, the
larger the degree of heterogeneity between the two countries’ technologies, the lower the
number of firms in each country, and the lower the degree of product differentiation.
The intuition for this result is as follows. An increase in emission tax in country a
causes each firm in that country to reduce its emissions. It has no direct effect on the firms
in the other country. However, the increase in the emission tax in country a raises the unit
cost of production for all the firms in that country giving the firms in the other country a
competitive advantage. This reduces output levels of the firms in country a and raises that
in country b. The increase in output levels in country b leads to an increase in emissions
in that country. This latter effect can dominate when country b has a sufficiently more
pollution-intensive technology, because in that case even a small output increase in country
b will lead to a large increase in emissions in that country and may therefore cause the total
level of emissions to rise despite a decrease in emissions in country a. This result is stated
formally as:
9

Proposition 2 A unilateral increase in emission tax in one country can increase global
emission levels if the other country has a significantly more pollution-intensive technology
than the first country.
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The impact of multilateral policy reform

Having established the possibility that an unilateral increase in the level of emission tax
in one country can increase total emissions by the two countries, we now want to examine
whether a concerted multilateral increase in emission taxes may unambiguously reduce total
pollution. As is well known, there are a number of different rules which a multilateral reform
can follow. The two most common rules are (i) an equiproportional rule, and (ii) a concertina
rule (see, for example, Turunen-Red and Woodland (2002a)). In the former case, percentage
changes in the tax rates are the same, i.e.,
dti = αti ,

i = a, b,

(22)

where α is a positive number. In the latter case, the absolute level of changes in the two tax
rates are the same, i.e.,
dti = δ,

i = a, b,

(23)

where δ is a positive number.
If the initial tax rate in a country is very small, then the equiproportional rule effectively means that there is very little increase in the tax rate in that country. The impact
of the reform is then mainly driven by the impact of the tax increase in the country with
the relatively high tax rate. In this case it can be shown, by appealing to our earlier result,
that the equiproportional rule cannot always guarantee a decrease in total emissions. In
particular, total emisions will increase if a country has a very low initial tax rate and a
sufficiently more pollution-intensive technology than the other country. This combination is
10

not unrealistic: part of the reason for the presence of a pollution-intensive technology in a
country could be a low level of environmental taxation in that country.
We now examine the effect of a multilateral increase in emission taxes according to
the concertina rule on total emissions, starting with the benchmark case of no product differentiation. Note that with the concertina rule, countries with low initial levels of emission
taxes cannot get away with small increases in the taxes. When there is no product differena
b
b
a
tiation, i.e., f1a = f2b = f2a = f1b and f11
= f22
= f21
= f12
, and the concertina rule is applied,

adding (18) and (19) we find
∆
∂E
∂E
dE = ∆
+∆
δ
∂ta
∂tb
=−

i
∆na ∆nb h
0 2
00
00
0 2
00
00
−
n
(θ
)
(t
θ
+
c
)
+
n
(θ
)
(t
θ
+
c
)
−
a
b
b
a
a
b
b
b
a
a
ga00
gb00

a
+ na nb [α1 f1a + α2 f11
],

(24)

where
α1 =

(θa0

−
2

2
θb0 )

(θb0 )2 (θa0 )2
+
+
,
na
nb
2

α2 = (θa0 ) xb + (θb0 ) xa − θa0 θb0 (xa + xb ).

(25)

It can be easily verified that α2 /α1 < na xa + nb xb and therefore using Assumption
a
1 it follows that α1 f1a + α2 f11
< 0. Hence dE < 0: a multilateral reform of emission taxes

according to the concertina rule unambiguously reduces global pollution.
This result is robust to the introduction of product differentiation, at least for linear
demand and cost functions. If the inverse demand functions are given by
pa = 1 − na xa − γnb xb ,
pb = 1 − nb xb − γna xa ,
where 0 < γ < 1 is an inverse measure of the degree of product differentiation, we have
b
b
a
a
= 0, and c00a = c00b = θa00 = θb00 = 0. Then
= f22
= f21
= f12
f1a = f2b = −1, f1b = f2a = −γ, f11

11

from (20) and the corresponding expression for country b, we obtain
∆
∂E
∂E
+∆
dE = ∆
δ
∂ta
∂tb
∆na
∆nb
+ na θa0 [nb γθb0 − θa0 (1 + nb )] − 00 + nb θb0 [na γθa0 − θb0 (1 + na )]
00
ga
gb
h
i
∆na ∆nb
2
2
2
= − 00 − 00 − na (θa0 ) − nb (θb0 ) − na nb (θa0 − θb0 ) + 2(1 − γ)θa0 θb0 ,
ga
gb
=−

(26)

whence it follows that dE < 0.
The results of this section are stated formally as:

Proposition 3 Whereas a multilateral equiproportional increase in emission taxes can sometimes increase global emission levels, an increase in emission taxes according to the concertina
rule unambiguously reduces global emission levels.

The above result has important implications for the design of multilateral environmental policy reforms. In particular, if the policy makers follow the concertina rule in designing
a multilateral reform of emission taxes, the presence of asymmetries between nations cannot
cause the reform to increase total emissions and thus cannot be used as an excuse by any
country for not implementing the multilateral agreement.

5

Conclusion

The world today is not only very diverse in terms of incomes, endowments and technologies,
but it is also highly interlinked. Unilateral actions by one country can have serious adverse
effect on other countries. There is no better example of these international externalities
than environmental degradation. However, although serious headways have been made on
multilateral agreements on international trade, such agreements on environment have faced
serious obstacles from important sources. Asymmetries in pollution technologies between
12

nations and in the agreements themselves are often used to justify the non-ratification of
environmental treaties. In this paper we have examined if the multilateral reforms of environmental policies could be designed in a way that asymmetries in pollution technologies
cannot make the reforms counterproductive.
We develop a two country model of oligopolistic interdependence in which asymmetric firms decide on their output and emission levels simultaneously. In this framework we
examine the effect of unilateral and multilateral reforms of abatement subsidies and emission
taxes on the level of global emission. We find that any increase in abatement subsidies unambiguously reduces global welfare. This result is consistent with previous literature where
the number of firms is taken as fixed. We also find that unilateral and equiproportional
multilateral increase in emission taxes may increase global emission if the firms are sufficiently asymmetric in terms of their pollution technologies. In particular, if a country with
an initial low level of emission tax has a significantly more pollution-intensive technology
than the other country, an equiproportional multilateral increase in emission taxes will increase global emission levels. However, if the multilateral reform is of the concertina type —
i.e., both countries increase their emission taxes by the same absolute amount — then the
reform will unambiguously reduce global emission levels. Thus our study suggests that there
does indeed exist a rule for multilateral reform of emission taxes under which asymmetries
between countries cannot make the reform counterproductive.
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